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ABSTRACT 
Wikipedia Show-Offs: IQ Signaling in Online Information Pools 
Christian Yoder 
Online information pools such as Wikipedia, Youtube, and Reddit, rely on 
contributions from members to succeed. These venues operate as public goods, being non-
excludable and non-rival, and they typically do not compensate contributors. As such, 
contributions appear to be altruistic, and the enterprise subject to collective action problems, 
such as free riding. Despite this, the internet is replete with examples of successful 
information pools. A potential but un-tested explanation for altruism in this context is found 
in costly signaling theory. Costly signaling theory assumes that altruism is apparent rather 
than real; signals are in fact genetically self-interested acts that are compensated by receivers. 
If costly signaling theory is correct, contributions to online information pools must contain 
signals of some kind, signaling should be more intense under conditions where signalers are 
potentially rewarded by receivers, and receivers should be able to reliably infer signal content 
from contributions. This thesis tested whether contributions to ostensible wiki-style 
encyclopedias signal intelligence, group commitment, introversion-extraversion, or 
conscientiousness. To induce motivation, participants made their wiki-style contributions 
under conditions where they believed themselves to be either identifiable to receivers (i.e., 
and motivated to signal) or not. Contribution quality increased with participant intelligence, 
and, consistent with costly signaling theory, this was true only when participants believed 
they were identifiable to receivers. Further, receivers reliably inferred contributor intelligence 
from judgments of contribution quality, but only in when participants were identifiable. 
There was no evidence for signaling of other qualities. The findings suggest that 
contributions to online information pools are not examples of altruism, but are in fact signals 
 v 
of intelligence that are reliably inferred by receivers from contribution quality. 
Recommendations for future research and practical implications are discussed. 
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Wikipedia Show-Offs: IQ Signaling in Online Information Pools 
A hallmark of the web is its ability to facilitate the creation of massive repositories of 
media content that are predominantly created by non-experts. Websites such as Wikipedia, 
Reddit, and YouTube, for example, rely on the contributions of millions of disaggregated 
non-expert users. These media, which are venues for consumption as well as participation, 
have been referred to as information pools (Cheshire & Antin, 2008). Because these sites 
typically do not provide tangible compensation for contributions, and because users are not 
required to contribute, contributions appear to be altruistic and the system vulnerable to free 
riding. Thus, research has been focused on understanding why users contribute to online 
information pools.  
Researchers have investigated the effects of various motivations (e.g. Lakhani & 
Wolf, 2003; Oreg & Nov, 2008; Nov, 2007; Nov, Naaman, Ye, 2010; Roberts, Hann, & 
Slaughter, 2006; Cho, Chen, Chung, 2010), and website design features (e.g. Nov, Naaman, 
& Ye, 2010; Cheshire & Antin, 2008) on contributions. However, relying exclusively on 
proximal explanations, this work does not address why people would be altruistic when the 
temptation to free-ride is patently strong. From an evolutionary perspective, altruism is a 
challenging puzzle. Evolutionary biology has produced an array of theories that explain 
altruism, but they have not yet been applied to explaining contributions to online information 
pools. While several evolutionary theories of altruism can potentially explain contributions to 
online information pools, costly signaling theory provides a strong prima facie case; as such 
it is the focus of this thesis (Grafen, 1990; Zahavi, 1995). A better understanding of what 
motivates people to contribute to information pools could also provide practical guidance for 
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managing online information contributions. 
In what follows, I review current research on online contributions and consider 
several evolutionary accounts of altruism, with a focus on costly signaling theory. The 
proximate and evolutionary research is used to develop three hypotheses about signal 
content, which are tested in an experiment. 
Proximal Motivations for Contributions to Online Information Pools 
Research on contributions to online information pools has focused on proximal 
motivations for contributions and web site design features. 
 Desire for status. Research suggests that people are consciously aware of a number of 
motivations for contributions to open-source software communities. One potential motivator 
for contributing to an online information pool is a desire for status. Roberts, Hann, and 
Slaughter (2006) conducted a longitudinal survey of nearly 300 open-source software 
contributors and found that the desire for status was highly predictive of contribution 
amounts.  
 Intrinsic motivations. While extrinsic motivations such as a desire for status are a 
potential factor motivating contributions, intrinsic motivations may also play a part. Lakhani 
and Wolf (2005) surveyed nearly 700 software developers and found that self-reports of the 
ability to express creativity was their primary motivation for participating in open-source 
software projects. Similarly, Oreg and Nov (2008) found that contributions to open-source 
software were associated with reputation building and self-development, while contributions 
to Wikipedia were associated with altruistic motives as assessed by a 3-item self-report scale. 
In a separate study, a survey of Wikipedia contributors found that altruistic motives were 
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predictive of self-reports of intent to contribute to Wikipedia (Cho, Chen, & Chung, 2010)  
 Social identification. Identifying with the recipients of contributions may also play a 
role in contributors’ motivations to create content. Nov, Naaman and Ye (2010), for example, 
found that respondents commitment to the online community Flickr was positively associated 
with the number of photos they uploaded. Similarly, Flanagin, Hocevar, and Samatiho (2013) 
found that college students were more motivated to contribute to a fictitious website 
resembling ‘Rate My Professor’ when they were led to believe that the recipients of the 
contributions were similar to them.  
Design decisions can also affect rates of contributions, presumably because these 
features affect or induce motivations in contributors. For example, Cheshire and Antin (2008) 
tested a variety of feedback messages on voluntary crowd-sourced tasks on the website 
Mycroft. They found that contributors produced more content when they were thanked, 
shown a list of their past contributions, and ranked by contribution frequency in relation to 
other users (i.e., implying that status may have been a motivating factor). Similarly, Rashid et 
al. (2006) found that users of a movie-rating database were more likely to contribute ratings 
to audiences with similar rather than dissimilar genre preferences (i.e., suggesting a role for 
identification with similar others). Contributors also produced more ratings when they 
believed that their audience more highly valued their ratings (i.e., suggesting status motives).   
Situational Effects on Contributions to Public Goods 
Free riding refers to situations in which it is possible to benefit from a good without 
incurring costs. For example, a publicly-funded radio station is vulnerable to free riding 
because listeners may choose not to contribute. Likewise, Wikipedia offers another example 
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of a good that is vulnerable to free riding: People can read entries on Wikipedia without 
contributing themselves.  
Free riding has been labeled ‘social loafing’ by social psychologists (e.g., Latané, 
Williams, & Harkins, 1979), and occasionally studied in the online context. Much research 
has been conducted on the factors that exacerbate and alleviate social loafing. For example, 
one factor that has been shown to reduce social loafing in collaborative tasks is 
identifiability. Williams, Harkins, and Latané (1981) demonstrated that participants shout 
less loudly in groups than individually. However, when participants were led to believe that 
their shouts were identifiable to others their shouts were as loud as participants who shouted 
alone. Williams et al. speculated that identifiability decreases social loafing because it 
increases the fear of negative evaluation.  
Factors that contribute to or alleviate social loafing have been explored in online 
environments using the collective effort model (Karau & Williams, 1993). For example, Ling 
and colleagues (2005) discovered that people contributed more to collaborative tasks when 
they perceived their contributions were important to the group. While not explicitly invoking 
the collective effort model, Kimmerle and Cress (2008) explored contribution outcomes in an 
online information pool through an experiment with identifiable and non-identifiable 
conditions. Consistent with the literature on social loafing, the authors found that participants 
contributed more to a shared database when contributors could see each other’s contributions 
than when they could not. 
Evolution and Altruism 
While the proximal research shows that contributions to public goods are most likely 
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to take place under conditions of identifiability, and that there are likely to be motivational 
reasons for those contributions, a number of questions remain. In particular, the explanations 
offered for group behavior are all proximal accounts of motivations  From an evolutionary 
perceptive, contributions to public goods without compensation (i.e., altruism) is not to be 
expected and requires special explanation. A fuller explanation is needed that elucidates not 
just the proximal mechanisms that explain how motivations link to behaviors, but also the 
deeper functional significance of these motivations. In fact, biologists have developed a 
number of ingenious theories to explain apparent altruism, none of which have been applied 
to explaining contributions to online public goods. As such, this thesis follows calls within 
the field to adopt biological approaches to understanding human communication (Cappella, 
1996; Weber, Sherry, & Mathiak, 2008). 
From a gene-centric perspective (Hamilton, 1964; Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976), 
altruism is puzzling. Given that genes are the unit of selection, it follows that organisms that 
provide fitness benefits to other organisms would, over time, disappear from the gene pool. 
How could a gene evolve that causes an organism to provide benefits to another organism 
without any apparent benefit? This starting proposition has led to several proposed solutions 
to explaining away apparent altruism. In each case, the explanation rests upon finding ways 
in which the seemingly altruistic behavior is actually selfish, and provides net benefits to the 
altruist. The major theories include kin selection (Hamilton, 1964), reciprocal altruism 
(Trivers, 1971), and costly signaling theory (Zahavi, 1975)
1
.   
                                                          
1
 It is worthwhile to briefly consider the orthodoxy that the selfish gene approach replaced; namely, group 
selection (Wynne-Edwards, 1962). The theory assumes that organisms are selected and evolve at the level of 
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Kin selection (Hamilton 1964) theory was the first to provide a gene-centric 
explanation for the emergence of altruism. Kin selection theory assumes that genes are the 
unit of selection, and that “altruism” can exist if net benefits are given to others who share 
genes for altruism. The frequency of altruistic genes can increase in a population, even if 
individuals suffer costs, so long as the genes shared among individuals receive net benefits. 
Kin selection theory assumes that genes for reciprocity are likely to be shared among people 
who have a relatively close genetic association—i.e., kin. While kin selection theory has 
provided a strong explanation for the emergence of altruism, it is not clear how the theory 
would apply in the context of the internet, a globally distributed, decentralized virtual 
environment where users are more often than not unrelated. The model requires that people 
can reliably infer the likelihood that they are interacting with kin, or that they can estimate 
this using (evolved) heuristics. In either case, interactions with people with palpably different 
ethno-linguistic heritages should obviate the kin selection process. If the kin selection 
process is operative in the online environment, it is likely that it only occurs in the context of 
strong ingroup relationships. 
A second gene-centric model, put forth by Trivers (1971), assumes that altruism can 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
groups, and that groups with individuals who behave altruistically are more apt to survive and reproduce than 
groups whose members behave selfishly. While intuitively plausible, this model requires that two strict but rare 
conditions are met: Genes must not be transferred among groups for evolutionary stability to emerge, and 
groups that are less altruistic would also have to have much lower levels of fitness (Williams, 1966). Both 
conditions are unlikely to be met in human groups where gene flow is high, and compromised group fitness is 
rare. Further still, pure group selection models do not meet the conditions for evolutionary stability. Namely, 
groups in which individuals follow a purely altruistic strategy are vulnerable to social parasitism, which would 
be strongly selected. A group of altruists would confer fitness benefits on selfish individuals, thereby replacing 
altruism as a strategy (Maynard Smith, 1964). While group selection continues to have proponents in the form 
multi-level selection models (e.g., Wilson, 2005), the theory has rarely attracted empirical attention. Parsimony 
and empirical evidence weighs heavily in favor of the selfish gene theory (see Dawkins, 1976). 
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evolve when acts of generosity are reciprocated in the future. For example, an altruist with a 
surplus who provided food to another person would receive a net benefit in the long run if the 
favor is returned in the future when he or she had a surfeit of food. Further, the model can be 
shown to be evolutionarily stable as cheating is curtailed if “cheating has later adverse effects 
on [the cheater's] life which outweigh the benefits of not reciprocating” (Trivers, 1971, p. 
36). While this model may apply in some cases of online information sharing, it is likely that 
the model does not typically apply because there is often no mechanism for ensuring 
reciprocity or effectively policing cheats.  
Costly signaling theory is the third gene-centric model. Costly signaling theory 
assumes that altruistic behaviors are social signals that benefit signalers and receivers. 
Formally, a signal is “an act or structure that alters the behavior of another organism, which 
evolved because of that effect, and which is effective because the receiver’s response has 
also evolved” (Maynard Smith & Harper, 1995, p. 15). According to costly signaling theory, 
signals alter the behavior of other organisms because they provide information about traits 
possessed by the signaler. For example, the peacock’s tail (their size, symmetry, and 
configuration) signals genetic quality to females, which is useful in mate selection (Zahavi, 
1975). The signal is beneficial to the male because it enables him to attract mates, and it is 
beneficial to the female because she can choose the best quality male. 
The key insight of costly signaling theory is that it explains how signals can be 
honest, despite the strong incentive to cheat (i.e., provide the phenotypic expression of the 
signal without possessing the signaled trait). Cheating is decreased to a tolerably low level 
because signalers of higher quality are able to afford to signal more intensely than lower 
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quality individuals. As signal intensity increases, the costs to the individual are 
proportionately greater, but so too are the benefits. Thus, highly intense signals are 
worthwhile to individuals who possess the quality in question (i.e., they are rewarded with 
fitness benefits), but individuals who do not possess the quality in question find the costs 
prohibitive. Through this cost/benefit mechanism, signal intensity tracks signaler qualities. 
These qualities are signaled honestly to receivers (on average), and thus evolutionary 
stability is achieved—in this case, an evolved communication system. To continue with 
Zahavi's example, the bigger and brighter the peacock’s tail (i.e. the more intense the signal), 
the greater the costs paid. Bigger tails are more metabolically costly, and large bright 
plumage will make it more difficult to evade predators. Thus, a peacock that possesses a 
large and bright tail must also possess commensurate phenotypic qualities such as strength, 
speed, or pathogen resistance that allows him to survive despite these handicaps. At the same 
time, males who lack these qualities would find the costs prohibitive, because they are likely 
to suffer disease or predation. Thus, the peacock's tail reliably signals underlying quality, 
female preferences for males with larger tails evolves, and cheating is reduced to a level that 
is tolerably low to receivers.  
Costly Signaling and Signal Content in Altruistic Acts 
If costly signaling theory is correct, then putatively altruistic behavior must be a form 
of social signaling in which a hidden quality about signalers is communicated to receivers for 
genetically selfish reasons. Research has been largely focused on discovering what these 
hidden qualities might be, and/or the benefits for altruists. 
Intelligence. Millet and Dewitte (2007) have argued that altruistic behavior signals 
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general intelligence. Because intelligent people are better able to acquire resources, their 
generosity is less costly (even if they have yet to acquire those resources)—a key condition 
in costly signaling theory (see Grafen, 1990). They support their claim through a study 
involving a modified social dilemma game that allowed a distinction between “cooperative 
behavior” and “altruistic behavior.” As in the aforementioned study, participants could 
choose how much they wanted to contribute to a public good, a behavior that is personally 
costly but beneficial to the larger group. Participants were then categorized as altruistic, 
cooperative, or selfish depending on their contribution amounts. The researchers then 
measured participants' intelligence and found that altruists scored higher on an IQ test than 
both cooperative and selfish participants.  
But why might someone wish to signal intelligence in the first place? Recent 
evidence suggests that intelligence is linked to general fitness. For example, Deary and Der 
(2005) found greater longevity among people with higher intelligence, even after controlling 
for a variety of socioeconomic factors. Miller (2000) has proposed a “general fitness factor” 
that influences everything about an individual's ability to survive and reproduce, and that 
mental health, sexual attractiveness, physical strength, and intelligence are all indicators of 
this underlying fitness factor. Indeed, there are positive associations between general 
intelligence and body symmetry (Prokosch, Yeo, & Miller, 2005), and semen quality (Pierce, 
Miller, Arden, & Gottfredson, 2009), and a negative association between intelligence and 
medical abnormalities (Arden, Gottfredson, Miller, 2009). These observations suggest that 
intelligence may be signaled: Those of higher intelligence possess higher general fitness; 
generosity is less costly for people of higher intelligence; receivers can benefit from 
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relationships with higher rather than lower intelligence people; and higher intelligence people 
can benefit from signaling—they can attract mates, deter rivals, or forge coalitional 
relationships. 
Group commitment. Sosis (2003, 2006) has used costly signaling theory to explain 
costly religious rituals and costly tribal practices including ritual scarification, tattooing, and 
genital mutilation. Sosis (2006) hypothesized that these costly rituals act as a signal of 
ingroup commitment in groups that are characteristically involved in warfare. The signal of 
commitment would decrease the rate of freeriding, which is at a premium when the chances 
of death in combat are high. The costliness of such signals ensures their reliability, as “only 
those who are committed to the group's beliefs and goals will be willing to incur the time, 
energetic, and opportunity costs of ritual performance” (p. 235). 
Sexually-selected traits. Griskevicius, Tybur, Sundie, Cialdini, Miller, & Kenrick 
(2007), argued that altruistic behaviors serve as advertisements of desirable qualities in 
mates, such as the ability to provide parental investment. For example, Griskevicius et al. 
found that people are more willing to engage in benevolent acts when they are conspicuous 
(i.e. presented to a large audience), especially after a sexual prime. However, the willingness 
to engage in seemingly “benevolent” acts depended both on the sex of the participant and 
specific acts. For example, men were more likely to report wishing to engage in acts of 
heroism and bravery (e.g., saving strangers from a bear), while women were more like to 
report conspicuous helping (e.g., volunteering at a homeless shelter). Further support for 
altruism as a mating device is found in evidence demonstrating that altruists are more 
desirable for long-term relationships than their “neutral” counterparts (Barclay, 2010).  
 Signaling in Online Information Pools          
11 
 
Physical strength and ability. Smith and Bliege Bird (2000) have hypothesized that 
altruistic behaviors can honestly signal strength, agility, and other physical abilities. The 
researchers provide a case study in which people living on an island in the Torres Strait 
engage in the physically taxing, difficult, and dangerous activity of turtle hunting only to gift 
the turtle meat to neighboring villages. While the activity does not appear to benefit the 
hunters themselves, Smith and Bliege Bird argue that such an act offers a reliable signal of 
physical ability that is then compensated through the conferral of status, the intimidation of 
rivals, and the attraction of coalition partners. 
Status signaling. Finally, researchers have argued that people perform altruistic acts 
in order to accrue status. Although not signal content in and of itself, the benefit of 
heightened status might explain why people behave altruistically. Hardy and van Vugt (2006) 
suggested that altruists are rewarded with status and prestige by their communities, which in 
turn benefit receivers with the altruist's continued presence. As a result, altruists seek to 
outcompete each other's generosity. Hardy and van Vugt confirmed their “competitive 
altruism” hypothesis through an experiment involving a public good dilemma. In this 
experiment, participants were given a small starting pool of money. They could either 
contribute to a private fund, which they would each keep in its entirety, or they could put the 
money into a public fund where it was multiplied and split among the group. The incentive 
structure ensured that each individual was financially better off by contributing to his or her 
own fund, but worse off than if all participants contributed to the group fund. Hardy and van 
Vugt found that while altruists earned significantly less than selfish participants, they also 
received a significantly higher status rating and were more likely to be selected as the group 
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leader. Further, this effect was only confirmed in an experimental condition where reputation 
was tracked.   
In sum, research suggests that altruism signals group commitment, leader-like traits, 
physical ability, intelligence, and sex-typical sexually selected traits.   
What is Signaled in an Online Environment? 
The proximal and evolutionary research considered above provides the basis for 
hypotheses on signal content in online information pools. Given that the focus here will be a 
Wikipedia-style environment, it is possible to discount some forms of signal content, and 
generate hypotheses for others. 
Proximal research on contributions suggests that signaling does occur in computer-
mediated environments. In the context of a computer-mediated environment, it would appear 
unlikely that physical ability (Smith & Bliege Bird, 2000) is signaled as making contributions 
to a Wikipedia page is presumably not particularly physically taxing. Similarly, signaling of 
sexually dimorphic traits (Barclay, 2010; Griskevicius et al., 2007) via contributions to an 
online information pool would also seem unlikely in many cases. Finally, while status could 
play a role in incentivizing signalers to engage in signaling, it could not be the content of the 
signal itself. Rather, status would only be an emergent property of signaling. For example, 
signaling intelligence or group commitment may lead to heightened status for the contributor, 
but status is not the information being advertised. For this reason, status is not measured as a 
potential piece of content being signaled in the present study.  
 Contributions to online information pools may signal intelligence. It is possible that 
contributions showcase an individual’s intelligence through knowledge of otherwise 
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“useless” technical and arcane subject matter. Research has demonstrated that intelligence 
could be indicative of general fitness (e.g. Prokosch, Yeo, & Miller, 2005), and many online 
information pools would offer a logical platform for advertising intelligence. Furthermore, 
since signaling should exist only under conditions where the signal is identifiable by a 
receiver (Smith & Bliege Bird, 2000), it is hypothesized that: 
 H1: Contributions to online information pools act as signals of intelligence. More 
 intelligent contributors will contribute more and better quality contributions, but only 
 when their contributors are identifiable to receivers. 
 Group commitment is another strong possibility for signal content. As reviewed, there 
is proximal evidence that commitment to a group or community increases the likelihood of 
public contributions (e.g., Flanagin et al, 2013; Nov, Naaman and Ye, 2010). Likewise, the 
evolutionary literature suggests that group commitment is a costly signal that is embedded in 
religious rituals (Sosis, 2003) and tribal scarification (Sosis, 2006). While virtual 
communities may not be communities in the traditional sense, the internet has provided an 
unprecedentedly powerful tool for the creation of ad hoc communities that are centered 
around a variety of different subcultures, hobbies, health issues and so on. Some scholars 
have even predicted that the internet will radically alter human social organization and the 
concept of community (e.g. Benkler, 2006; Shirky, 2008). It is plausible that contributions to 
online information pools, such as writing entries on Wikipedia, are signals of solidarity with 
a specific online community. Thus, if group commitment is signaled, then: 
 H2: Contributors who identify with the community behind the creation of the online 
 information pool will contribute more and better quality contributions but only when 
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the  contributors are identifiable to receivers. 
It is also possible that other attributes are signaled in the online environment but have 
not been investigated in prior research. Personality traits including introversion-extraversion 
and conscientiousness may be signaled. Introversion-extraversion could have various 
benefits. Extraverts may be better able to navigate social networks and thereby serve as 
useful coalition partners. More extraverted people may be more able and willing to engage 
with a group at large and thereby eke out more beneficial social exchange relationships than 
introverts. On the other hand, introverts may be more trusting or cooperative exchange 
partners. Similarly, conscientiousness may indicate reliability in the completion of protracted 
tasks that are of mutual benefit. While speculative, it is worth noting that we do not know 
whether online contributions contain signals nor what signal content they might constitute. 
The measurement of a relatively broad-set of potential signals is therefore warranted. 
Finally, it is possible that signals contain multiple pieces of information and 
simultaneously signal all of the attributes that are considered here. Indeed, the hypothesized 
signal contents are not mutually exclusive. I therefore consider the following research 
question: 
RQ: Do contributions to online information pools function as signals of intelligence, 
group commitment, introversion-extraversion, conscientiousness, or a combination of these 
traits? 
Finally, since both signals and receiver’s responses to signals are evolved (Maynard 
Smith & Harper, 1995), receivers must be able to reliably infer the signaler’s levels of the 
trait in question: 
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H3: If contributors use online information pools as platforms for signaling, then 
readers  of these contributions can accurately infer the content of these signals. The 
content of these signals will be mediated by contribution quantity or judgments of 
contribution quality, particularly in the identifiable condition where trait(s) are most likely to 
be advertised.
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Method 
Participants and Design  
This two-part study followed a one-way between subjects design with potential signal 
traits (i.e., IQ, group identification, introversion-extraversion, conscientiousness) as 
measured moderator variables. In part one, participants’ general intelligence, social 
identification with the communication discipline, and demographic information were 
measured. In part two, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions in which they were asked to contribute to a wiki-style encyclopedia on the UCSB 
Department of Communication. Contributions were solicited under conditions where 
participants would ostensibly be personally identifiable or not to readers of the article entry 
(i.e., incoming students). At the conclusion of part two, personality constructs, introversion-
extraversion and conscientiousness were also measured. The focal dependent measures were 
the perceived quality of participants' contributions, as assessed by four coders blind to 
experimental conditions, as well as quantity of contributions, as assessed by a simple word 
count. 
One hundred and eighteen participants were recruited from the UCSB Department of 
Communication undergraduate research participant pool. Participants were brought in the 
research lab on two occasions separated by approximately 1 week. Participants were told that 
the study concerned understanding the creation of crowd-sourced online encyclopedias 
(wikis) such as Wikipedia. Ninety eight of the original 118 participants completed both parts 
of the experiment (28 male; Mage = 19.4,  SD = 1.65). Participants who completed both parts 
of the experiment were used in the analyses. 
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Materials and Procedures 
 Part one. General intelligence “g” was assessed using Raven’s advanced progressive 
matrices. This test measures the “eductive ability” component of g, and factor analytic 
studies have repeatedly demonstrated the test to be one of the most valid measures of g 
available (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). While the full test is allotted 40 minutes, this time 
limit can be reduced in light of experimental constraints (see Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). 
In this experiment, subjects were allotted 20 minutes, a time reduction that is expected to 
slightly reduce the validity of the test. However, the 20-minute version of the test is a reliable 
predictor (r = .74) of the 40-minute version (Hamel & Schmittmann, 2006).   
Participants then completed an adapted version of Hogg and Hains' (1996) 9-item 
social identification measure that assessed the degree to which participants identified with the 
major. For example, participants were asked “how similar do you feel to those in the field of 
communication in terms of general attitudes and beliefs?”; “how well do you feel that you fit 
into the field of communication?”; and “how much do you identify with others in the field of 
communication?”. This measure was highly reliable (α = .92).  
Part two. Participants returned approximately one week later to contribute to an 
ostensibly real wiki-style encyclopedia being created by the Department of Communication. 
Subjects were told that the wiki would serve as a repository of information for incoming 
first-year students, and that it would contain entries related to campus life, culture, and 
academics. Participants were also told that the wiki was being pilot tested, and that their 
participation would help the researcher gain insight into the wiki creation process. By using 
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the campus community as the theme for the wiki, all participants had at least some 
knowledge that they could potentially use in creating an entry. Participants completed their 
entries in private laboratory rooms on a computer that displayed the wiki. The wiki 
resembled Wikipedia and contained a collection of preliminary articles that were created by 
an undergraduate research assistant prior to the experiment (see Figures 1 and 2).  
Participants were told that they could contribute as little or as many entries to the wiki 
with as little or as much content as they would like. Participants were also told that they 
could contribute nothing at all. The choice of topic for a wiki entry was left entirely up to the 
participants. However, participants were supplied with a list of sample topics (i.e. classes, 
professors, a nearby place to eat, Del Playa avenue, a local bar, a campus event, a fraternity 
or a sorority, downtown Santa Barbara or another location of interest, an honors society or 
club, the school newspaper, or any other topic that is somehow related to UCSB life, culture, 
or academics). Participants made their contributions in a word-processing document and 
were told that they could use any information that they could find online (with the exception 
of images). The freedom of choice in article content mimics real-world Wikipedia entries, 
and allows for an ecologically valid test of the hypotheses. Each participant was told that 
they would have 30 minutes to make a contribution. 
Figure 1.  
The homepage of the wiki that was used in the experiment 
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Figure 2 
 Sample Pages from the Wiki Used in the Experiment. 
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 Identifiability Induction. Subjects contributing to the wiki were randomly-assigned 
to one of two conditions. In the identifiable condition, subjects had their photo taken and 
were told that the photo would be placed next to their contribution. The subjects' names also 
appeared in the word-processor document that contained their contribution, indicating that 
their identity would be linked to the contribution. In the unidentifiable condition, the subjects' 
photo was not taken and their name did not appear in the word-processor document. 
 After 30 minutes had passed, subjects completed abbreviated 12-item, 5-point Likert-
type scales (1 strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree) that measured introversion-extraversion (α 
= .80)  and conscientiousness (α = .85). These scales were taken from the NEO Five-Factor 
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Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992).  
 As potential covariates, participants rated “How seriously did you take the writing 
assignment that you just completed?” (1 Not at all seriously, 7 Very seriously), “How 
knowledgeable were you about the topic(s) you chose to write about?” (1 Not at all 
knowledgeable, 7 Very knowledgeable), and “How much effort did you put into the writing 
assignment?” (1 Very little effort, 7 A lot of effort). The completion of this questionnaire 
concluded the second part of the experiment.  
 Dependent measures. The quality of the wiki contributions was rated by four 
undergraduate research assistants who were blind to experimental conditions. The research 
assistants were asked to “describe the quality” of each article on a 7-point Likert-type scale 
(1 Very low quality, 7 Very high quality). Finally, the research assistants judged the 
contributors' intelligence relative to other subjects and their level of identification with the 
discipline of communication, both using 7-point Likert-type scale items (1 Much dumber 
than average, 7 Much smarter than average and 1 Not committed at all, 7 Very committed, 
respectively). These questions were asked in order to ascertain whether readers of the 
contributions could receive these signals of unobservable traits, if participants were indeed 
using the wiki platform to advertise these traits.  
 The size of the wiki contributions was measured using the word count of the subject's 
wiki entry. If the subject wrote multiple wiki entries, the word count was summed across the 
aggregate of all the subject's wiki entries. This allows tests of quality and quantity as 
dependent measures of contributions. 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics and data transformations 
 Subjects wrote on a variety of topics ranging from classes and local restaurants to 
professors and campus events. The following is an excerpt of an entry entitled UCSB  
“Undie-Run”: 
UCSB is one of many college campuses that participate in the philanthropic event 
known as the “Undie Run”. The Undie Run occurs typically on the last Wednesday 
night of finals week at the end of each quarter. Participants gather at Storke Tower or 
the Davidson Library and remove all of their clothing until they’re left in just 
underwear. The clothes that are removed from their bodies are donated to charity. 
After undressing, the students run into the streets of Isla Vista and back onto campus. 
The purpose of participation varies from student to student, whether they want to de-
stress, rebel, have fun, and/or donate to charity. 
 The sample compositions for each of the two conditions were similar. Subjects in the 
unidentifiable condition identified slightly more with the field of communication, were 
slightly more extroverted, and slightly more conscientious (see Table 1 for a breakdown of 
descriptive statistics for each condition). A Shapiro-Wilks test revealed that the distributions 
of the article entry lengths as measured by word count were non-normal for the control 
condition, w = .93, p < .01 and the experimental condition, w = .92, p < .01. Log 
transformations normalized each of these distributions, leading to w = .98, p =.56 for both 
conditions. The average quality ratings for the control and experimental conditions were 
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already normally distributed, w = .98, p = .44 and w = .99, p = .86, respectively.  
 Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) were computed (see Shrout and Fleiss, 
1979) for establishing rater reliability. For article quality, the intraclass correlation using a 
two-way random effects model revealed moderate reliability for the average of quality 
ratings across all raters (ICC = .67).  
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics by condition  
Condition Identifiable (n = 52) Unidentifiable (n = 46) 
 M SD M SD 
IQ score (out of 36) 20.33 4.02 20.87 3.72 
Social identification 6.90 1.26 7.26 .93 
Conscientiousness 3.66 .56 3.78 .59 
Extraversion 3.41 .57 3.51 .47 
Entry length (word count) 335.42 166.65  325.07 164.97 
Entry quality  4.43 1.00 4.03 1.21 
 
Correlations of the variables listed revealed that entry length was correlated with the 
perceived entry quality, r = .53. Both intelligence and identifiability were correlated 
somewhat with entry quality, r = .22 and r = .20, while conscientiousness and extraversion 
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had very small correlations with entry quality, r = .10 and r = .10, and entry length, r = .12 
and r = .17. Thus, it seems likely that the raters used the length of an entry as a proxy for its 
quality.  As a result, the length of the contribution was controlled for when assessing quality 
and vice versa in subsequent analyses.
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Table 2 
Correlation matrix of predictor and variables for identifiable and unidentifiable conditions 
 Social 
identification 
Intelligence Con. Extraversion Entry length Entry quality 
Social identification  -.27 .16 .15 .07 -.21 
Intelligence -.19  -.25 .02 -.23 .32* 
Conscientiousness .30* .27  -.16 .06 -.12 
Extraversion .12 .10 -.05  .05 .04 
Entry length -.07 .27 .26 .31*  .35* 
Entry quality -.06 .18 .34* .21 .69**  
* p < .05; **p < .01  Note: Correlation coefficients for participants in the identifiable condition are bolded
2
5
 
 Signaling in Online Information Pools          
26 
 
Tests of Focal Hypotheses 
Under H1 it was predicted that quality and/or quantity of contributions to online 
information pools function as signals of intelligence, and that these correlations would be 
more apparent in the identifiable than in the unidentifiable condition. 
As a first test of this hypothesis, the zero-order correlations were recalculated 
separately for the identifiable and unidentifiable conditions (see Table 2). In the identifiable 
condition, intelligence was significantly correlated with entry quality, r = .32, p < .05, but not 
in the unidentifiable condition, r = .18, p = .22. However, article length was not significantly 
correlated with entry length in the identifiable condition, r = -.23, p = .09, nor the 
unidentifiable condition, r = .27, p =.07. 
 As a more stringent test of H1, regression analyses were conducted that examined the 
effects of intelligence on entry quality while controlling for article length (recall that these 
constructs were correlated r = .53). The experimental condition was effects coded (-1 = 
unidentifiable, 1 = identifiable), intelligence was mean-centered, and an interaction term 
calculated. A regression model showed a main effect for experimental condition, β = .20, 
t(93) = 2.47, p < .05, for intelligence, β = .23, t(93) = 2.81, p < .01, and an interaction, β 
= .20, t(93) = 2.41, p < .05. 
A second model was created to test the simple slopes of intelligence on contribution 
quality within the two experimental conditions (see Figure 3). To test these simple slopes, the 
conditions were first coded to test for the effects of intelligence on entry quality for 
participants in the unidentifiable condition (identifiable = 1, unidentifiable = 0). In the 
unidentifiable condition, intelligence was not a reliable predictor of entry quality, β = -.01, 
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t(93) = -1.37, p = .17. To test the effect of intelligence on entry quality for participants in the 
identifiable condition, the conditions were reverse coded (identifiable = 0, unidentifiable = 
1). In this analysis, the effect of intelligence on entry quality was statistically significant, β 
= .44, t(93) = 3.98, p < .001. The simple slopes model next addressed the effect of the 
conditions on entry quality for participants of high intelligence and low intelligence. The 
effect of the conditions on entry quality for participants of low intelligence was assessed by 
creating a similar regression model and adding one standard deviation to the intelligence 
variable (σ = 3.87). The effect of intelligence in this analysis was non-significant, β = -.001, 
t(93) = -0.03, p = .97. A similar analysis was created for participants of high intelligence by 
subtracting one standard deviation from the intelligence variable. The effects of 
identifiability for this analysis were significant, β = .41, t(93) = -3.49, p = < .001. 
Figure 3 
The effect of intelligence and identifiabiliy on entry quality controlling for entry length 
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Under H2, it was predicted that contributors use online information pools as a 
platform for advertising group commitment. The zero-order correlations between social 
identification and entry length and social identification and entry quality were non-significant 
in the both conditions. Thus, H2 was unsupported.  
 Under RQ, the question was asked whether contributions to online 
information pools function as signals of intelligence, group commitment, introversion-
extraversion, conscientiousness, or a combination of these traits. The results of the 
experiment indicate that participants used the wiki only to advertise intelligence. 
Conscientiousness was positively associated with entry quality and extraversion was 
positively associated with entry length. However, this was only true in unidentifiable 
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condition. Thus, no support was found for participants advertising other traits.  
Under H3 it was predicted that if contributors use online information pools as 
platforms for signaling, then readers of these contributions can accurately infer the content of 
the signals, and that this ability would be more apparent in the identifiable than the 
unidentifiable condition. Given that there was only evidence that intelligence was signaled, 
the mediational hypothesis was tested for intelligence only. Thus, article quality judgments 
should mediate the effect of participant intelligence on judgments of intelligence, and do so 
most strongly in the identifiable condition. 
To test H3, a regression model was created to assess whether differences in 
intelligence lead to corresponding differences in the authors’ perceived intelligence, but only 
when mediated by entry quality. The experimental conditions were dummy coded, 
intelligence was mean centered, the interaction term included, and article length was a 
covariate. If H3 is correct, then the mediational model should fit more strongly in the 
identifiable than unidentifiable condition. (see Figure 4). The model was tested using the 
SPSS macro PROCESS (Hayes, 2008). 
Figure 4 
Full mediated regression model testing effect of author intelligence on perceived intelligence 
through contribution entries in identifiable and unidentifiable conditions.  
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Confidence intervals for indirect effects were calculated using 5,000 bias-corrected 
bootstrapped samples. In the identifiable condition, author intelligence was not positively 
associated perceived intelligence directly, β = .01, t(93) = .48, p = .63. However, author 
intelligence was positively associated with entry quality, β = .11, t(93) = 3.98, p < .001, 
which was in turn positively associated with the perceived intelligence of the writer, β = .56, 
t(95) = 12.40, p < .001. The mediational model was reliable, 95% CI [.02, .10]. 
 This model was repeated to test whether article quality judgments mediated the effect 
of writer intelligence on the perceived intelligence of the writer in the unidentifiable 
condition. As in the previous model, author intelligence did not directly predict perceived 
author intelligence β = .01, t(95) = .48, p = .63. Unlike the previous model, author 
intelligence was not associated with entry quality, β = .001, t(93) = .21, p = .83, although 
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entry quality still predicted judgments of author intelligence, β = .56, t(95) = 12.40, p < .001. 
As expected, this mediational model was not reliable, 95% CI [-.02, .03]). 
Figure 5 
Moderated mediated regression model testing effect of author intelligence on perceived 
intelligence through contribution entries. 
 
 Finally, as a more stringent test, the process model tested whether condition 
moderated the strength of the mediated effect. In this model, intelligence served as the 
independent variable, entry quality as the mediating variable (after controlling for entry 
length), and perceived intelligence was the outcome variable (Figure 5). The condition was 
inserted into the model as a moderator variable between intelligence and entry quality. As in 
the mediation model, intelligence was a significant predictor of entry quality, β = .06, t(93) = 
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2.81, p < .01, which was in turn a significant predictor of perceived intelligence, β = .56, 
t(95) = 12.40, p < .001. The direct effect of intelligence on perceived intelligence was not 
reliable, β = .56, t(95) = 12.40, p < .001, 95% CI [-.02, .03]. A moderated mediation index 
was computed using a test of equality of the conditional indirect effects between the two 
conditions. The index was reliable, 95% CI [.01, .11].     
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Discussion 
Altruistic behavior has long been a puzzle for evolutionary psychologists and 
biologists. Why would an organism behave in such a way that would seemingly benefit 
another organism without some reciprocal benefit? This puzzle has implications for public 
goods where individuals have a strong incentive to let others contribute while avoiding 
contributing themselves. Costly signaling theory provides a solution to this puzzle by 
interpreting altruistic behavior as a signal that provides benefits to the both the signaler and 
the receiver. Online information pools are public goods that suffer from the free rider 
problem. Nevertheless, many successful examples of these environments exist without any 
extrinsic reward structure. According to costly signaling theory, these environments could 
serve as platforms for individuals to signal some quality about themselves. We posited three 
potential qualities that people could be signaling in these environments: intelligence, group 
commitment, and personality traits.   
Author intelligence was positively associated with contribution quality, but only 
when contributions were made under conditions where those participants would be 
identifiable to receivers. Further, after controlling for the length of entries, subjects of higher 
intelligence wrote better quality articles but only when their contributions were identifiable. 
There was also evidence for the hypothesis that receivers can infer signaled traits. Namely, 
receivers were able to infer the intelligence of contributors through judgments of the quality 
of their contributions, but only in the identifiable condition. There was no evidence that 
participants used online information pools to signal social identification, introversion-
extraversion, or conscientiousness.   
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The results of this experiment suggested that people contribute to online information 
pools as a way of signaling intelligence. Several conditions should be met for a behavior to 
constitute a costly signal (Smith & Bliege Bird, 2000). One condition for costly signaling to 
occur is that the signal must be observable to receivers. If receivers could not process the 
signal, then the signaler would have no incentive to engage in costly advertising. Consistent 
with this prerequisite to signaling, a comparison of the two conditions revealed that 
participants contributed better quality information when their contributions were identifiable. 
Further, intelligence was a predictor of better entry quality but only in the identifiable 
condition, suggesting as costly signaling theory predicts, that signals are generated under 
conditions where signalers are motivated to do so.  
A second condition for costly signaling is that it must be a reliable indicator of some 
underlying traits possessed by the signaler. The positive relationship between entry quality 
and actual author intelligence suggests that more intelligent contributors make higher quality 
contributions. Further, the relationship between perceived author intelligence and actual 
author intelligence suggests that readers interpret those authors of higher quality entries as 
being smarter.  
A third feature of costly signaling theory is that signals must be costly to produce, 
and the costs paid are proportional to the quality possessed by the signaler. The present study 
did not examine the cost of the signal, which is the mechanism for ensuring the signal's 
reliability. To do so, future research might examine what those costs might be.  
Despite previous research which shows that group identification affects contributions 
in online information pools (e.g., Flanagin et al., 2013), participants who identified with the 
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field of communication did not contribute lengthier or better quality entries than those who 
did not identify with the discipline. One explanation for the lack of a relationship between 
social identification and the dependent variables may perhaps be attributed to the limited 
perceived benefits that a participant might accrue through signaling group commitment. 
Participants may benefit from advertising their intelligence to anybody, while signaling 
group commitment would only provide benefits to the signaler if the receivers of the signal 
also identify with the field of communication (such as other students in the department, 
faculty, and so on). Further, participants were told that the wiki was being created by the 
Department of Communication, but not that the beneficiaries of the wiki were necessarily 
students of communication. Thus, the beneficiaries of the wiki content might hold little 
interest as to whether the contributor was committed to the field of communication, which 
would in turn decrease the incentive for advertising such a trait. Contributors still have an 
incentive to advertise intelligence, however, because the beneficiary of the wiki is also is a 
receiver of the signal in this case. It is also possible that a wiki on a university is a more 
logical platform to advertise intelligence. If the wiki focused specifically on sports, for 
example, then intention to advertise group commitment may have played a larger role.   
While this experiment has provided evidence that intelligence is signaled in the 
context of online contributions, further steps are necessary to provide a full test of costly 
signaling theory. Namely, a final condition for costly signaling is that it must offer 
compensating benefits to signalers and receivers. There are a number of potential reasons that 
people might signal intelligence. One possibility is that intelligent people make more 
effective coalition partners than their less intelligent counterparts. The ability to understand, 
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analyze, and synthesize information about the world has obvious survival benefits such as 
overcoming the evolutionary defenses of plants and animals (Pinker, 2010). Through 
advertising this highly desirable trait, intelligent people are seemingly more able to attract 
allies and mates. Further, other studies have linked intelligence with attractiveness 
(Kanazawa, 2011), body symmetry (Prokosch, Yeo, & Miller, 2005), and lower rates of 
certain medical abnormalities (Arden, Gottfredson, Miller, 2009). All this provides 
information to signal receivers that can benefit both the signaler and the receiver.  
A reader might rightly point out that most contributions in an information pool such 
as Wikipedia are created anonymously. In the case of Wikipedia, this is the case for 
unregistered users. However, top contributors to the online encyclopedia have registered user 
names (Wikipedia: List of Wikipedians by number edits, 2014). Further, Wikipedia has stark 
contribution inequalities: Roughly 10 percent of registered users contribute nearly 90 percent 
of all information (Ortega, Gonzales-Barahona, & Robles, 2008). These elite “Wikipedians” 
are often active participants in offline community events such as Wikimania, an annual 
international conference for users of the wiki projects (Wikipedia community, 2014). Thus, 
while most Wikipedia editors are indeed anonymous, those doing the vast majority of the 
contributing do have visibility in the offline world. For example, Wikipedia's current top 
contributor (user name koavf) has a succinct biography on the site that reveals his identity. 
Thus, for top contributors of Wikipedia, contributions are not necessarily anonymous. A 
future study might examine the relationship between the intelligence of actual Wikipedia 
contributors and their contributions.  
The current study has several limitations. First, its sample was taken from a pool of 
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undergraduates who are not likely representative of information pool contributors generally. 
For example, this sample was far more female dominated than samples taken of Wikipedians 
(Lam et al., 2011). Secondly, the experimental design of soliciting wiki entries bears little 
resemblance to the real world of creation process of Wikipedia. Thus, the study suffers from 
low ecological validity. These issues could be mitigated through a study that applies the 
theoretical framework of costly signaling theory to actual Wikipedians, though the research 
would sacrifice experimental control as a result. Finally, this study did not examine the 
potential costs that must necessarily be associated with a signal. Presumably, the cost of time 
committed to researching and writing an entry to an information pool such as Wikipedia 
woul make up at least some of the cost. Future research could assess potential costs 
associated with contributing. The outcome of this study results in a recommendation for 
systems designers and maintainers of online information pools: Information pools with 
higher levels of identifiability would likely lead to higher quality contributions in these 
environments. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis sought to better understand why certain people behave altruistically 
online. Specifically, I was interested in why these people engaged in contributing to online 
information pools, such as Wikipedia, when they could easily free ride by benefiting from 
such information repositories without incurring the cost of helping create and maintain them. 
The study employed a theory originally from evolutionary biology that accounts for the 
emergence of altruism in humans. Such charitable behavior, it was argued, is a costly signal 
that benefits both signalers and receivers. Signalers can use this altruistic behavior to 
reliability advertise some underlying quality about themselves, while receivers gain 
information about the signaler. An experiment involving university undergraduate 
participants offered partial support for the hypothesis that people contribute to such online 
information pools to advertise intelligence. While intelligence was not associated with length 
of contributions to a fake wiki, it was positively associated with quality of contributions. 
Future research should examine questions of costly signaling in actual online information 
pools to see if findings are consistent with those found in the experiment conducted in this 
study. 
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